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ABSTRACT 
 
 The paper explores the characteristics of the present economic crisis at enterprise level and its 
comsequences for possible growth after the crisis. The study builds on international experiences 
concerning recovery from crisis during the previous economic downturns between 1980 and 2002.  
 Survey results in Hungary and Slovakia are presented with special attention to how companies 
tried to react to the present economic recession. The study analyses the possible consequences of the 
strategies followed by the Slovakian and Hungarian firms during the crisis period from the point of 
view of capabilities for utilizing the options for growth when demand will start to increase.    
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The present worldwide economic crisis has drastical consequences for most of the 
economies in the world. Cross-border business and international trade declined in 2009 by 
about 9%, and foreign direct investment dropped by more than 40% in the same year 
(Ghemawat, 2010, p. 56). While the leading nations of the world economy were phased with 
recession, countries like China and India have progressed further on their growth path. China 
realized 66% of global growth in GDP, and India 11% in 2009 (Ghemawat, 2010, p. 56). The 
projected high growth rate of the BRIC2 countries will lead to radical restructuring in the 
world economy where North America and Europe will lose its previous political and 
economic influence. According to the Goldaman Sachs forecast, „by 2020 the BRICs will 
account for a third of the global economy and contribute about 49,0% of global GDP growth” 
(BRICS Monthly, May 20, 2010).  
 The crisis has influenced enormously the transforming Central and Eastern European 
economies as well. Some of these countries like Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria had serious 
difficulties due to macroeconomic imbalance and increasing inflation (Muraközy, 2010). 
These countries were not prepared for the consequences of the rapidly spreading crisis, and – 
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contributing to the difficulties – seriously underestimated the possible extent of the crisis. In 
Hungary for example the official opinion of the Hungarian National Bank in early October 
2008 was that the crisis will not have relevant consequences for the economy. Two months 
later the National Bank and the Hungarian Government started intensive work on preparing a 
plan to prevent the Hungarian economy from collapse. The financial aid of the IMF was 
necessary for the survival of Hungary in 2009 and 2010.     
  As we arrive closer and closer to the end of the crisis period, the really interesting 
strategic question is what will be happening after the crisis. Whether will the development 
path repeat the tendencies followed before the crisis, or totally new directions of development 
will emerge. We have rather limited research evidence to answer properly this question. 
Scholars try to get answeres by studying the consequences of the previous crisis periods 
(Gulati, Nohria and Wohlgezogen, 2010). But the present crisis is unique in its nature, 
expansion and rather accelerated spread all over the world. 
 The present paper tries to analyse the above issue from a company angle. We are 
interested in learning what has happened during the crisis, what were the reactions of 
companies to the emerging new economic, technological and social conditions, and what 
tendencies of development may be identified at the present stage of the crisis. The author has 
been involved in studies at the above areas for some years and has conducted empirical 
studies in Hungary and the Slovak Republic. The empirical background of the paper includes 
analysis of publications of researchers engaged in doing surveys in the field (e.g. Ringland, 
Sparrow and Lusteig, 2000; Waldman, 2010), as well as primary data collections though 
questionnaire surveys and interviews conducted in Hungary and the Slovak Republic. 
 
MACROECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
 
 Hungary and Slovakia has a lot of similarities concerning the social, economic and 
political hertage dating back to the period before the political changes around 1990 (Kiezun, 
1991). But behind these similarities there are interesting alterations in the patterns of 
development, expecially after 1990 (Balaton, 2007).  
 Hungary was rather successful in hosting relatively large volume of foreign direct 
investments (FDI) during the first half of the 1990s. The Hungarian Government decided to 
adapt the sales type of privatisation. It meant that state owned firms were offered for sales for 
those who could offer acceptable prices for the companies. As capital inside the country was 
rather limited, that type of privatisation resulted in the overwhelming role of foreign investors 
in the ownership structure of enterprises located in Hungary by the end of the century. The 
accumulated high dept at the time of the political turnaround urged for the sales type of 
privatisation and it was the only possibility to pay back the loans from the income of 
privatisation. 
 Slovakia (and until January 1993 Czechslovakia) followed different economic policy 
concerning privatisation. Vouchers were distributed among the population and these vouchers 
could be changed into shares of state owned enterprises. The shares than were purchesed by 
investment funds owned by state owned banks. So the privatisation had resulted in restored 
state ownerhsip of enterprises by the mid 1990s. No relevant structural changes were 
implemented during the first half of the 1990s (Clark and Soulsby, 1999). This policy had 
temporary macroeconomic advantages compared to Hungary. While in Hungary the 
restructiring was relatively accelerated it resulted in high level of inflation (about 39% in 
1993), great depression (38% GDP decline between 1989 and 1993 measured by comparable 
prices, and about 17% unemployment rate) (Kornai, 1993), in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia there were no such radical consequences. Economic restructuring had taken a major 
step in Slovakia after the involvement of foreign direct investors during the second half of the 
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1990s. The necessary restructuring resulted in economic slow-down, inflation and increasing 
unemployment as well, but these consequences were moderate in their extent compared to 
that of Hungary.  
 Slovakia was rather sussessful since the second half of the 1990s in inviting foreing 
direct  investors especially in the motorcar industry. This fact has contributed to the relatively 
fast growth rate of the Slovak Republic around the turn of the century and helped the 
integration of Slovakia into the European Union. The growth rate of the country has even 
accelerated after the integration and it has resulted in the capability to change to the Euro as 
the national currency in 2009.  
 In the same period Hungary became less attractive for foreign investors, partially due 
to high tax rates and increasing level of macroeconomic instability and forecastability, parallel 
with rapidly speading corruption. During the period between 2002 and 2010 the economic 
stability of Hungary has eroded and the county became uncapable of introducing the Euro. 
State expenditures had exceeded the level of incomes and the county was near to bankrupty 
during the summer of 2010. The newly elected Government has introduced radical measures 
to restore the balance and the first results of it may be observed at the beginning of 2011.  
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON STRATEGIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS AT ENTERPRISE LEVEL 
 
 The start of the present economic crisis has been marked by filing for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection by Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. Within six months the 
crisis has spead throughout the wold and endangered many previously successful economies 
like Ireland. Even economically stable economies like the US, Germany and France were hit 
seriously and the consequences will influence the coming years in nearly all countries of the 
world.  
 As the crisis today is becoming closer to its end, more and more scholars are interested 
in discovering what will happen after the crisis. Harvard Business Review has published a 
series of three papers in the March 2010 issue, dealing with „Strategy in a Weak Recovery”. 
The articles signed by influential authors like Pankaj Ghemawat, Ranjay Gulati, Nitin Nohria 
and others agree that rather limited research evidence is available in the field and they tried to 
get ideas by studying the experiences of the previous crises since 1980. Although the authors 
admit that the previous crises were much more limited in their enpansion and were also 
different in their origin and nature, they have arrived some conclusions worth of having in 
mind when thinking on possible future enterprise strategies after the present economic crisis. 
One of the important conclusions drawn by Gulati, Nohria and Wohlgezogen (2010) is that 
concentration only on cost-cutting during the crisis will hardly lead to successful expansion 
after the crisis (Gulati et al., 2010. p. 65). The authors have found that emphasis on 
operational efficiency parallel with concentration on market development and asset 
investment have resulted in the best results measured by increase in sales income and 
EBITDA (Gulati et al., 2010. p. 67). Mere concentration on reduction of employment level 
and cost cutting have not resulted in successful recovery after the crisis.  
 It is also noteworthy from their studies that concentration only on innovation and asset 
investment during the crisis was not connected to successful enterprise performance after the 
crisis. So neither restriction nor mere innovation in itself seemed not to be the proper cure 
during the economics crises. Parallel efforts of economic stabilization and renewal seems to 
be the advisable solution based on the examples of the three crisis periods between 1980 and 
2002.  
 In developing such solutions organizations may probably learn useful lessons from the 
idea of combining exploration with exploitation (March, 1991). It is also a lesson to be beared 
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in mind that rapid, short term solutions often have disadvantages evaluated by taking into 
account consequences on the long run (March, 2003). Another framework to discuss the 
necessary changes during crisis is to get engaged in first-order or second-order changes. 
Bakacsi argues that „It is the leader’s responsibility to decide whether the system needs first-
order or second-order change, and therefore initiate rather double-loop learning, istead of 
sinlge-loop.” (Bakacsi, 2010, p. 7). 
 Ghemawat (2010, p. 57) has forecasted the possibly more important role to adapt to 
local norms and the growing organizational power of the local country. Parallel with 
increased pressures on pricing, multinationals have to be sensitive to regional varieties of their  
offering, as local differences will become more important (Ghemawat, 2010. p. 589. These 
organizational changes will increase diversity within multinational firms, but at the same time 
create the need for cohesive corporate cultures and tightening talent management practices 
(Ghemawat, 2010. p. 60).  
 Rapid development in IT systems have continued even during the crisis. Companies 
planning their new strategies for the period after the crisis have to bear in mind that their 
rivals have invested a lot during the last years in technologies and applications, and in order to 
be able to maintain advantageous competitive position it is necessary to use the oppportunities 
of real-time data and reports, and have ambitious, flexible managers in key positions 
throughtut the organization (Sull, 2010, p.73).    
 As a consequence of the accelerated changes and turbulence during the last few years 
some authors speak about the next wave of creative disruption. Waldman in his recent book 
postulates: „In fact, the growth of the mobile internet, the return of economic growth after 
2012, and the constant potential for entrepreneurs to come up with products and services that 
satisfy fundamental consumer needs are, I believe, going to drive another great wave of 
creative disruption in the near future.  …I predict that the era of creative disruption has only 
really just begun.” (Waldman, 2010, p. 46-48).  
 The radical strategic changes possibly emerging during the coming years will probably 
have an influence of the organizational structures and processes companies will be adopting. 
Ringland et al. (2010, pp. 90-92) speak about double-cone organizations where traditional 
hierarchy dealing with specified and routinized activities will be existing parallel with 
activities chracterized by lack of clarity, ad hoc solutions, private inspiration, and luck. The 
well-known structures and mechanisms of control systems, governance and asset allocation 
have to live together with spreading ac hoc mechanisms and organizational sturctures 
described as adhocracies (Mintzberg, 1983).  
 Summarizing the above discussed predictions for the after-crisis situation it may be 
stated that there seems to be limited possibility for using previously prescribed solutions. 
Learning, adaptation to emerging new situations and flexibility may be regarded as crucial 
capabilities organization of the future will need in order to be competitive. Bahrami and 
Evans have formulated that requirement as follows: „The object of becoming super-flexible is 
to be able to either intentionally precipitate a transformation, or to make modifications in 
response to changing situations. Adaptation occurs either during the course of, or after, an 
unfolding change episode, and may simply be random in that one may be just at the right 
place at the right time.” (Bahrami and Evans, 2005, p. 22).  
 
RESEARCH METHODS AND SAMPLES 
 
 Research methods utilized in both countries included questionnaire surveys.  
Interviews with top managers, analysis of company documents and case study development 
were conducted in Slovakia. In Hungary interviews and case study research will be done leter 
this year. In Slovakia both the questionnaire survey, the case studies and the interviews were 
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conducted by grauating studenst at master level under the supervision of the present author. 
Findings have been summarized in Master theses defended at Selye János University in years 
2009 and 2010. The questionnaire survey included 200 companies in Slovakia. Distribution 
according to number of employees were as follows: below 10 employees: 34%, between 10 
and 49: 39%, between 50 and 99: 14%, between 100 and 249: 13%. 49% of the firms 
belonged to the service sector, 34% to industry, 4% to agriculture, and 12% to public 
administration (Muraközy, 2009, pp.: 40-41).  
 The Hungarian survey was part of a larger research endeavour aiming at studying the 
competitiveness of Hungarian enterprises. The author was responsible for coordinating the 
research work related to enterprise strategies. The survey was conducted in Hungary between 
April and November 2009. The survey collected answeres from 1246 top managers working 
in 313 enterprises, belonging mainly to the SME sector. Distribution of firms according to 
number of employees were as follows: 47% of the firms had employees between 50 and 99, 
21% below 50, 20% between 100 and 29, and only 2% had more than one thousand 
employees. Manufacturing industry companies represented 42,4% of the sample. Service 
firms had a ratio of 23,0%, and trading companies 19,1%. The empirical findigs used in the 
present paper have been published in the Preliminary Report of the survey (Chikán, Czakó 
and Zoltayné Paprika, [eds.], 2010).  
 
REACTIONS OF ENTERPRISES TO THE CRISIS  
IN HUNGARY AND SLOVAKIA 
 
Hungarian experiences 
 
 Our empirical evidences from the questionnaire survey in Hungary show that the first 
– and most frequently observable – reaction of enterprises were to reduce cost levels, to 
downsize operations and reshape organizational structures towards more simple and less 
expensive management systems. This is the traditionally observable reacton of companies and 
this strategy is most frequently adviced for executives by standard textbooks of economics 
and management. This strategy has resulted in many cases in capabilities to survive the crisis 
situation and preserve condition for continuing business activities when the crisis would have 
had its end.  
 Our sample shows that 34,6% of the companies suffered more than 10% decrease in 
domestic sales turnover in 2009 compared to the previous year, while 20,3% experince less 
than 10% decrease. 24,5% of the firms reported stagnation in their comestic sales. 35,9% 
realized less that 10% growth, and 15,0% managed to increase domestic sales turnover by 
more than 10%. 
 In export sales 40,4% of the companies reported more than 10% annual decrease, and 
20,2% less than 10% decrease. 18% of the firms in our sample experienced stagnation in 
exports, and 13,5% managed to realize modest growth bellow 10%, and only 7,9% was 
cabable to increase export sales by more than 10%. 
 The crisis resulted in relevant changes in company strategies. While during the 
previous surveys in 2004, 1999, and 1996 realization of profit was the most important target, 
in the 2009 survey 170 company (60,3%) gave the answer that surviving the crises was the 
most important aim, and 123 mentioned profit realization as the no. 1 strategic goal. The most 
frequently followed strategy was defensive (26% of firms), and shrinking strategy proved to 
be no. 2 (20% of companies). In 2008 growth oriented strategies were the most frequently 
observable ones (43%), and defensive strategies were followed by less than 10 % of the firms. 
In 2009 companies mainly used their resources to defend their existing market positions. The 
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defensive strategy in many cases was not the consequence of a purposeful strategy, but more 
as a result of lack of strategy and a situation which might be described as muddling-through.  
 It was a clear sign of defensive enterprise strategies that R&D was evaluated as the 
less import funcional area within the company. 43% of the firms have not had branded 
products. The companies in our sample more frequently used the company name as brand 
name, and only one fifth of the sample firms had independent product brand names. The ratio 
of companies introducing new products and technologies has decreased compared to the 
previous survey in 2004. Companies generally complained that they got limited state support 
for innovation and lack of adequate financial resources was mentioned as a major reason 
behind the limited innovation. The importance of organization development was also under-
evaluated by the responding managers. Modernization of organizational and management 
structures got rather limited importance among the priorities of top managers.  
 The overall picture observable in the survey of 2009 shows a rather defensive 
management approach where companies concentrate only on survival. They generally did not 
have strategies concerning how to start development, had rather restricted information on their 
future possibilities, and in many cases have not had clear strategic direction. We could hardly 
observe conscious steps to improve existing products and even more to develop new ones, and 
upgrade existing technologies. The marketing efforts only concentrated on maintaining 
existing market shares and there were hardly any signs of trying to enter into new markets and 
develop products to be sold on new markets.  
 The characteristics of strategies of the Hungarian enterprises in 2009 do not offer real 
hopes for geting out of the crisis within a short period of time as the necessary preparatory 
actions were missing in the practices of the companies. We could not find any signs of 
managerial awareness related to need for innovation even during the crisis period in order to 
improve the prospects of the firm to realize growth when market demand will start to grow. 
 Connections to other enterprises and participation in networks can be regarded as a 
relevant factor of enterprise development from the point of view of the present paper. The 
questionnaire survey provides some information on network relationships of enterprises. The 
survey of 2009 shows that Hungarian enterprises preferred short term contract relations 
instead of longer term ones. It was explained by top managers as an intention to increase 
flexibility (Chikán et al., 2010, p.46). It is a positive feature of inter-company relationships 
that cooperations in research and development have started to grow. The ratio of R&D 
cooperations was the highest compared to the previous surveys within the competitiveness 
research. This is somehow a contradictory feature as other characteristics of enterprise activity 
do not show clear signs of recognition of the need for innovation.   
 
Slovakian experiences3 
 
 The questionnaire survey in Slovakia was conducted between September 2008 and 
February 2009, a few month before the Hungarian survey. The overall picture of the survey 
reveals that companies stagnated or decreased the volume of their output. A majority of the 
responding managers (59%) shared the view that the crises will last for about 2 to 3 years (end 
of the crisis was connected to starting increase of the GDP in the country).  
 Labor costs were unchanged in 51% of the companies, while 26% reported decrease, 
and another 15% forecasted changes during the coming months. Possible increase in wage 
level was mentioned by 5% of the respondents. Expenditure related to education and training 
was unchanged in 33% of the firms, it degreased in 31%, and 21% of the managers expected 
decrease during 2009. 12% forecasted increase in educational expenditures. 
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 Costs related to advertisement and communication remained unchanged in 34% of the 
firms, it decreased in 29%, and expected decrease was reported by 17% of the respondents. 
Expected growth of costs were mentioned by 13% of the companies in the sample. Overall 
marketing expenditures were unchanged in the practice of 60% of the firms, decrease was 
reported by 14%, and expected decrease by another 14%. Possible increase of marketing cost 
was mentioned by 9% of the answers.  
 Investments were reduced in 32% of the companies, 27% reported no changes, and 
28% mentioned possible decrease during the coming months. Increase in investments were 
forecasted by 12% of the firms.  
 Intruduction of new technologies were reported as being unchanged in its intensity 
after the crisis by 56%, and decrease was mentioned by 13%. Possible decrease was the 
experience of 12%, and possible increase was reported by 15% of the managers. Increase in 
the intensity of introducing new technologies was characteristic for 4% of the firms.  
 It can be seen from the above data that innovation and growth was less characteristic 
for Slovakian firms during the crisis period. There were however some examples showing  
company strategies different from the generally observable ones. Let us take the exampe of an 
internet service providing company is Southern Slovakia (Csiba, 2010). The firm has been set 
up in 1997 by Slovakian privat persons. Today it is owned by one slovakian entrepreneur. The 
firm started its activity in wireless access provision and became the member of the European 
Coordination Centre in 2000. The company continued its expansion strategy during the early 
2000s by expanding its products portfolio and geographical coverage. The strategy followed 
may be described as a tipical diversitfication strategy and it proved to be rather successful. 
Meeting customer expectations and flexible adaptation to changes in the market is a strong 
element in the strategy of the firm. 
 The company continuously invested in upgrading and extending its service providing 
network during the crisis period. The firm did not change the previously followed 
differentiation strategy and introduced new services called FiberHome and PanelNet Max. 
The optical network of the firm had been extended in years 2009 and 2010. At the beginning 
of 2010 the company defined its strategy as aiming continuous growth by providing high 
quality services taking into account the environment protection criterias and extending the 
services towards new regions in Southern Slovakia. The emerging major profile of the firm in 
the future is defined as extending access to the Internet (Csiba, 2010).  
 
Comparison of the Hungarian and Slovakian experiences during the crisis 
 
 Emprirical eviedence summarized above concerning the strategies of Hungarian and 
Slovakian companies during the crisis period shows that in both countries defensive strategies 
aiming at reducing costs of operation by laying off employees and reducing production and 
service provision capacities had dominant roles. Innovation and preparation for growth after 
the crisis was hardly observable in the practice of companies we analized. Companing the 
Hungarian and Slovakian data we may observe however that the Hungarian companies were 
even less innovation oriented than the Slovakian firms. Data on growth, innovation and 
expansion showed somewhat higher values in the Slovakian survey. The example of the 
innovative Slovakian internet service providing company clearly shows the possibilitiy to go 
ahead even in a period of economic downturn. Using Internet may be regarded as a relevant 
element of future development either at private individual and enterprise levels. The owner of 
the Slovakian firm had understood this challenge and gave adequate answere to the 
opportunity. The latter example shows that perception and attitude of owners and executives 
can make a difference. As Leavitt has described it, path-finding managers can open the road 
towards innovation and growth (Leavitt, 1986).  
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DISCUSSION 
 
 The surveys during the period of economic crisis show that survival and short term 
orientation was characteristic for most of the enterprises. Goals related to innovation and 
growth were hardly present in the strategies of enterprises. While the general picture is rather 
negative from the point of view of preparation for the period after the recession, there are 
some examples showing that there are possibilities for other ways of thinking. The case of the 
innovative Slovakian internet service prividing firm shows that when ownership and top 
management aspirations are motivated by longer term considerations, innovation may have a 
stake in shorter term enterprise strategies as well.  
 The above consideration shows that executive orientation and way of strategic 
thinking has a decisive role in company strategies during the crisis period.  Another important 
influencing factor behind was the awailable financial resources which provided possibility for 
executives to think ahead and start preparations for the possible growth period after the crisis. 
Our empirical studies show that this way of thinking was observable at the minority of 
enterprises especially in case of SMEs.  
 The entreprenurially minded managers of the latter group of firms shared the view that 
the crisis period is not only an area with difficult problems to be solved in a short period of 
time, but at the same time it is a period of unprecedented opportunities to move forward and 
develop competitive advanteges when increase in demands will have been arriving 
(Waldman, 2010). These companies strarted to develop new R&D projects, invested in 
broader areas of innovation and now they are more or less prepared to launch their new 
products and services which represent a higher level of technological development and meet 
customer needs at a higher level compared to the period before the crisis.  
 Based on his previous experiences and insights concerning the future possible 
directions of strategic development the present author is convinced the the success stories 
after the crises will be connected to enterprises following the innovatation trajectory during 
the years of crisis.  
 Another field of development obserable in our empirical studies is related to the 
increasing role of inter-organizational relationships through different forms of strategic 
alliances and emergence of clusters. The permanently prevailing need for cost efficiency and 
improvement of innovation capabilities drives companies towards new forms of strategic 
alliances enhancing the capabilities of business firms to accelerate innovation, develop new 
capabilites though co-operation, share risks and make costly innovation projects financially 
realizable. The above development tendencies were observable especially in industries 
characteriezed by seviour competition, high technological development rates and needs for 
meeting new customer expectations (see: Hokansson and Lind, 2004).  
 
 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH OPTIONS 
 
We have to admit that the available empirical evidences are rather limited from the point of 
view of making general forecasts for the future development tendencies. Additional research 
work is needed covering broader areas of enterprises and a more concentrated focus on the 
connections between innovation and future growth options of enterprises. Special attention 
should be devoted to the SME sector as it has an important role in future econonic growth. 
But the observable intentions of the enterprises in our surveys probably provide possibilities 
for drawing attention to the emerging new tendencies and new strategic logics developed by 
enterprise managers.  
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 It can be seen that managerial behaviour concentrating on short term survival is not 
favourable for realizing the possibilities of growth which will be provided when the crisis will 
have been finished. Inreasing demand for products and services parallel with starting 
economic growth will offer outstanding growth option for those companies which have made 
the necessary prepapatory steps during the crisis years. It seems to be clear that enterprises 
capable of offering new products and services representing higher level of technological 
capabilites and better adjustment to customer requirements will have the winning position 
after the crisis. This forecast is supported by the observable fact that during the crisis period in 
Hungary companies concentrating on R&D had the possibility for increasing their sales 
turnover.  
 Further and more extended studies will be necessary to check whether the above 
sketched directions of development are broadly observable new tendencies of enterprise level 
strategic management, or they are only examples observable locally. The present author and 
his colleagues have been working on this research question.  
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